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I.

INTRODUCTION

IN LIGHT OF THE MODERN DAY ADVENT of the federal
administrative state, access to the federal courts for review of
federal administrative action is of crucial importance to a panoply of
potential individual plaintiffs.' Unfortunately, there are gaps in the
present law of federal jurisdiction, and obtaining review of the actions
of federal officials can be very difficult, if not impossible, in a shockingly wide range of circumstances.
In many instances, a plaintiff will seek to compel a federal officer
to perform a particular act within his or her official capacity, contending that the federal officer is legally obligated to so perform.
Initially, for a federal court to entertain such a suit, it must have
the requisite power.' Since federal courts are special courts of limited
jurisdiction, this power is derived solely from congressional grants of
jurisdiction. 3 Accordingly, there are several potential avenues by
which jurisdiction may be obtained in these instances: 1) "statutory"
review; 4 2) the general federal question provisions of section 1331 (a)
t Staff Director and Counsel, Committee on Government Operations, Council
of the District of Columbia. B.A., American University, 1969; M.A., American
University, 1970; J.D., Antioch School of Law, 1975. Member, Pennsylvania and
District of Columbia Bars.
1. See Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and
"Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REv.
308 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Byse & Fiocca]; Comment, The JurisdictionalBasis
of Nonstatutory Judicial Review in Suits Against Federal Officers - Jurisdictional
Amount, The Administrative Procedure Act and Mandamus, 51 WASH. L. REv. 97
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Jurisdictional Basis].
2. For a discussion of the judicial review concept, see Project: Federal Administrative Law Developments - 1971, 1972 DUKE L.J. 115, 227-32 [hereinafter cited as
Project].
3. C.A. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 15 (2d ed. 1970).
4. See notes 9-12 and accompanying text infra.
(637)
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of title 28 of the United States Code (section 1331) ;" 3) section 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA);6 and 4) the Federal
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 (section 1361). 7 Where statutory
judicial review is not available, plaintiffs have shown a general
tendency to assert the latter three bases of jurisdiction and, as will
' '8
be shown, any one or a combination of these sources of "nonstatutory
review may be applicable in a given case. This article focuses upon
section 1361 and explains how an expansive reading of this provision
makes it a superior vehicle for entry into federal court in a suit to
compel performance by a federal officer. Initially, however, a brief
introductory glimpse of the remaining potential bases for jurisdiction,
and their infirmities, is appropriate.
The first, and least complicated, jurisdictional basis for judicial
review of federal administrative action is statutory review, wherein the
regulatory statute establishing the particular federal agency or unit
authorizes the federal courts to review administrative determinations,
decisions, and orders which "adversely affect" or "aggrieve" a person.9
Where this review is available, the jurisdictional hurdles which a
plaintiff faces are relatively minimal: generally, the action of the
administrative agency must constitute an "order" or be "final,"'" the
plaintiff must be a "person aggrieved" due to the administrative
action," and the plaintiff must have exhausted all of the available
12
administrative remedies.
Where statutory judicial review is not available, a plaintiff may
resort to several forms of nonstatutory judicial review. Section 1331
confers upon the federal courts jurisdiction over cases which "arise
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."'
If this were the only requirement, a suit to compel a federal officer
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) ; see notes 222-26 and accompanying text infra.
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1970) ; see notes 185-99 and accompanying text infra.
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e) (1970).
8. The term "nonstatutory" has been said to include
those proceedings which, without the assistance of a specific or general statutory
review provision, are brought against government officers to review their action
or inaction on the ground that the legal rights of the plaintiff have allegedly
been violated.
Jacoby, The Effect of Recent Changes in the Law of "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review,
53 GEO. L.J. 19 (1964).
Where the statute creating a federal agency and governing its operation
does not provide specific procedures for review of that agency's determinations, nonstatutory review may still be available. Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005 (5th
Cir. 1975).
9. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
10. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 25(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78(y) (1970).
11. Id.
12. K.C. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 382-95 (3d ed. 1972).

13. 28 U.S.C. §1331(a) (1970).
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to perform a function allegedly mandated by a federal statute or the
Constitution would present no jurisdictional obstacles. However,
section 1331 also requires that an amount greater than $10,000 be
alleged and, if challenged by the defendant, established as the "amount
in controversy." 14 In this context, plaintiff's task is framed as one
of placing a monetary value on the performance of a particular function by a federal officer. In many instances this performance is
allegedly required by constitutional principles and would therefore
require a federal court's assessment of the value of a constitutional
right. 5 Even where the asserted right is statutory, the necessity of
evaluation obviously presents formidable difficulties, as is reflected by
the confused state of the federal case law on this issue. 6
A textual reading of the judicial review provisions of the APA
suggests that Congress did not intend the APA to serve as an independent source of federal jurisdiction, but rather as a regulatory
scheme of judicial review of administrative action where there is
a preexisting basis of jurisdiction.' 7 The circuit courts have disagreed
on this issue, however, a slight majority of the circuits holding that
the APA is a jurisdiction-conferring provision. 8 This split among
the circuits has apparently resulted from conflicting policies since the
resolution of the question must be based upon policy considerations.' 9
The policies in conflict are the general hesitancy of the federal courts
to expand their jurisdiction by interpretation" versus the general
presumption of the reviewability of administrative action.2 ' Consequently, under this form of nonstatutory review, plaintiff's greatest

obstacle is obtaining venue in a circuit amenable to an assertion of
jurisdiction under the APA. The courts in these circuits would be
almost certain to find jurisdiction over suits to compel performance
by a federal officer, provided the official's action can be attributed to
an agency.22 However, even though jurisdiction may be established,
14. Id. See also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 547 (1972).
15. Spock v. David, 496 F.2d 1047, 1051-52 (3d Cir. 1972) ; Goldsmith v. Sutherland, 426 F.2d 1395, 1397-98 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970).
16. See id.
17. See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970). See also Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v.
Floete, 278 F.2d 912, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960).
18. See notes 191 & 192 and accompanying text infra.
19. See, e.g., Byse & Fiocca, supra note 1, at 326-31; Project, supra note 2, at 231.
20. Project,supranote 2, at 231.
21. See, e.g., Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) ; Project, supra note 2,
at 231.
22. See, e.g., Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966); McEachern
v. United States, 321 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1963).
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the question remains, as with section 1331, whether mandatory injunctive relief can be afforded as under section 1361.
It is clear that section 1361 is an independent jurisdictional grant,
and since it is one of the "special" federal question provisions, a suit
based upon this section requires no allegation of the amount in controversy.2 3 Since it is also clear that section 1361 was designed
specifically to confer district court jurisdiction over suits to compel
conduct by federal officers, 24 it is important to delineate its nature

and scope. Because the section refers to suits "in the nature of mandamus," federal courts, in attempting to establish the parameters of
section 1361, have tended to adhere to the common law of mandamus
and to the mandamus tradition as established by the federal courts of
the District of Columbia prior to 1962.25 Frequently, this reliance
upon arguably outdated mandamus principles has led to the dismissal
of suits against federal officers for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.26
Thus, in many instances, a plaintiff seeking to compel performance by a federal officer may be precluded from access to the federal
courts despite the assertion of three bases of federal jurisdiction. The
fundamental contention of this article is that Congress, through section 1361, intended to open the doors of the federal courts to suits
against federal officers: section 1361 was designed to fulfill the need
for a widely available jurisdictional basis to obtain affirmative relief
against federal officials, and to close interstices in federal jurisdiction.
Only its creative interpretation by the federal courts will transform
section 1361 into an effective device to assure minimal compliance by
federal officers with statutory mandates and constitutional requirements.
To understand the present and potential nature and scope of
section 1361, a brief sketch of the development of the common law
writ of mandamus, particularly in the District of Columbia federal
courts, is necessary.
II.

HISTORY OF THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS

The writ of mandamus was developed by the English law courts
as a broad remedial measure by which parties could be compelled to
perform in a certain manner. The English judiciary used the writ
creatively in situations where no other remedy was available. By
23.
24.
25.
26.
Avenue

Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
See note 55 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 56-58 and accompanying text infra.
See, e.g., Casarino v. United States, 431 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1970); Fifth
Peace Parade Comm'n v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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1762, on the eve of the American Revolution, its use was widespread"7
and a court could state with authority:
Where there is a right to execute an office, perform a service, or
exercise a franchise; (more especially, if it be in a matter of
public concern, or attended with profit;) and a person is kept
out of possession, or dispossessed of such right, and has no other
specific legal remedy; this Court ought to assist by a mandamus;
upon reasons of justice . . . and upon reasons of public policy,

to preserve peace, order, and good government.2 8

State courts in America adopted the English common law view
of mandamus, but in the federal courts the issuance of a writ became
intertwined with basic questions of separation of powers and federal
court jurisdiction. 29 In 1803, in Marbury v. Madison,30 the historic
confrontation between the branches of the United States Government,
the Supreme Court held that it lacked original jurisdiction to grant
a writ of mandamus. 3 ' Although Congress, through the Judiciary
Act of 1789,32 had attempted to grant such jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court concluded that its original jurisdiction was defined by the Constitution and could not be expanded by legislative action.83 Ten
years later, the Court held that lower federal courts, similarly limited
by the Constitution, also lacked original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus.84 In 1838, however, unlike other federal courts, the
27. See 16 RULING CASES 758-97 (1896).
28. Rex v. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. 823, 824 (K.B. 1762). The court in Barker,
after investigating the possibility of other remedial action, ordered that a Presbyterian
minister be restored to his former position after he had been wrongfully ousted as
leader of a congregation. Id. at 826. For other early English cases involving requests
for writs of mandamus, see The Case of Cardiffe Bridge, 91 Eng. Rep. 135 (K.B.
1700); James Bagg's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (K.B. 1615).
29. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
30. Id. In Marbury, the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme
Court to compel the newly inaugurated President Jefferson and his Secretary of State,
James Madison, to deliver a commission as justice of the peace, conferred upon the
plaintiff by President Adams in the last hours of Adams' presidency. Id.
31. Id. at 175-76.
32. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 80.
33. 5 U.S. at 175-76. Mandamus was available, however, to bolster already existing appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 175. See also Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S.
74, 87 n.8 (1970) ; In re Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 482 (1905) ; Ex parte Warmouth,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 64 (1872) (the Supreme Court has no power to issue a writ of
prohibition to a circuit court of the United States until that court issues an opinion) ;
H.

HART &

H.

WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm

290-300

(2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
34. M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 504 (1813). In M'Intire, the circuit
court in Ohio had been asked to issue a writ of mandamus to the "register" of the
federal land office in Ohio directing him to deliver to plaintiff a certificate for the
purchase of land. The Supreme Court held that the power of the circuit courts to
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was determined to
be a court of general, not limited, jurisdiction with the authority to
issue original writs of mandamus."5 The development of federal
mandamus law was thus confined to cases originating in the District
of Columbia courts until the passage of the Mandamus and Venue
6
Act more than a century later .
Two early Supreme Court cases defined the parameters of federal
mandamus law. Mandamus could issue "to enforce the performance
of a mere ministerial act" by an official, but it could not be used
to "guide and control his judgment or discretion in the matters com8
mitted to his care, in the ordinary discharge of his official duties."1
issue the writ of mandamus was "confined exclusively to those cases in which it may
be necessary to the exercise of their jurisdiction." Id. at 506.
In a later action, M'Intire sought the writ from a state court in Ohio. The
Supreme Court of the United States again held that mandamus was not available in
a state court against a federal officer. McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598
(1821). See also Ex parte Shockley, 17 F.2d 133 (N.D. Ohio 1926); Fischer v.
Davdistal, 9 F. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1881); Hinkle v. Town of Franklin, 118 W. Va. 585,
191 S.E. 291 (1937) ; Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers,
73 YALE L.J. 1385 (1964).
35. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 624 (1838).
In Kendall, the plaintiff and his business partner had received a contract to
deliver goods for the Postal Department. Subsequently, a new Postmaster General
found the contract disagreeable and refused to honor it, even after a special act had
been passed by Congress to resolve the dispute (Act of July 2, 1836, 6 Stat. 665).
Upon the plaintiff's filing of a petition for a writ of mandamus, the Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia held that mandamus should issue since no other remedy
was available to satisfy the obligation owed to the plaintiff. United States ex rel.
Stokes v. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. 702 (No. 15,517) (D.C. Cir. 1837), aff'd, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 524 (1838). The Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the writ, holding
that the District of Columbia court had been created on land dedicated by the state
of Maryland for that purpose, and thus inherited that state's common law jurisdiction,
which included original mandamus jurisdiction. Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 614, 626 (1838).
36. See notes 51-53 and accompanying text infra.
37. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838).
38. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840). In Decatur, the
Supreme Court affirmed the refusal of the lower court to issue a writ of mandamus.
compelling the Secretary of the Navy to award the plaintiff both a general widow's
pension fund and money allegedly due her under a congressional resolution. Id. at 517.
The Secretary's decision rested upon policy matters - the condition of pension funds
and the proper apportionment of available funds among the claimants - and was
clearly an exercise of discretion. Id. In resolving the merits against the petitioner,
the Court noted:
The first question . . . is whether the duty imposed . . . was a mere ministerial act.
The duty required .. . was to be performed by [the Secretary] as the head
of one of the executive departments of the government, in the ordinary discharge
of his official duties. In general, such duties . .. are not mere ministerial duties.
The head of an executive department of the government . . . is continually
required to exercise judgment and discretion.
[The Court cannot,] by mandamus, act directly upon the officer, and guide
and control his judgment or discretion in the matters committed to his care, in
the ordinary discharge of his official duties.
Id. at 514-15.
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This rigid distinction between ministerial duties, which could be compelled by mandamus, and discretionary actions, which could not be
compelled, controlled the issuance of writs of mandamus until the
20th century.3 9 Although the ministerial-discretionary distinction
has yet to be abandoned completely by the courts, the rapid growth
of the federal bureaucracy encouraged the judiciary to broaden its
conception of the proper scope for mandamus actions.4" In Roberts
v. United States,4 the Supreme Court ruled that the mere fact that
an official needed to construe a statute in determining his duty "[did]
not necessarily and in all cases make the duty . . . anything other

than a purely ministerial one." 4 2 Indeed, even a discretionary act
could be compelled, according to dicta in two subsequent Supreme
Court cases, if the official had transgressed existing statutory limits
on his discretion 43 or had refused entirely to act, in which case
mandamus could be used "to compel action

...

but not to direct the

exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way .... ""
In some cases brought against federal officials in the District
of Columbia courts during the decade preceding the enactment of section 1361, the courts appear to have found authority under the
umbrella of mandamus for both close scrutiny of any statute under
which a defendant-official operated and the fashioning of appropriate,
if novel, affirmative relief to aid the plaintiff.45 In McKay, v. Wahleninaier,4" an action brought against the Secretary of Interior, the court,
39. It has been said that
[t]he Kendall and Decatur cases fixed a doctrinal pattern, congenial to the
intellectual climate of the time, under which judicial control of executive action
was confined within close limits during the bulk of the nineteenth century, until
the expansion of executive and administrative powers began to force the development of new techniques of control and the reexamination of older attitudes.
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 33, at 1381. See also Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36 GEO. L.J. 287 (1948). For an early discussion
of the confusion surrounding the ministerial-discretionary distinction, see Patterson,
Ministerial and Discretionary Official Acts, 20 MicH. L. REv. 848 (1922).
40. See notes 70-73 and accompanying text infra.

41. 176 U.S. 221 (1900). In Roberts, the Supreme Court, affirming the lower
court's issuance of a writ to the Secretary of the Treasury, found mandamus appropriate to compel the Secretary to pay interest on certificates that had been unlawfully
detained by a federal agent. Id. at 222, 230-31.
42. Id. at 231.
43. Work v. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1924). However, the Court stated that
mandamus was not available if this statutory discretion included the final interpretation of a particular statute. Id.
44. Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218 (1930).
45. E.g., Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon, 348 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
see Byse & Fiocca, supra note 1, at 318. In that article, the authors state that theDistrict of Columbia courts, in cases brought against federal officials in which affirmative relief is requested, have focused upon the substantive issues involved and "havefor the most part avoided reliance on the much criticized ministerial-discretionary
distinction." Id.
46. 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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although speaking in terms of the traditional ministerial-discretionary
distinction, refused to defer to the Secretary's interpretation of a
statute under which he had power to issue oil and gas leases on
public lands. Rather, the court examined the statute and its accompanying regulations in detail and concluded that the Secretary had
wronged the plaintiff by awarding the lease to an unqualified applicant. Moreover, the court, in an action described by the dissenting
judge as "entirely unprecedented, '4 7 ordered the Secretary not only to
cancel the existing lease but also to award the lease to the plaintiff. 8
Thus, even at the time section 1361 was enacted, authority could
be found in existing federal cases to support the use of mandamus
to compel an official to perform a ministerial duty, to initiate discretionary acts which he was obligated to perform,4" to remain within
statutory limits imposed upon his discretion, and to correct a wrong
suffered by a plaintiff as a result of his improper action.5"
III.

EVOLUTION

OF MANDAMUS

UNDER SECTION

1361

Although prior to 1962 the common law writ of mandamus had
been available solely in the federal courts of the District of Columbia,
enactment of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 (section 1361)51
made the writ a readily available device for challenging official conduct
of federal officers and employees in all federal courts.12 Section 1361
provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a
duty owed to the plaintiff.5 3
While the enactment of section 1361 made judicial review of
federal administrative action more accessible to those seeking relief
47. Id. at 48 (Washington, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 47. See also Chambers v. Robertson, 183 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
rev'd, 341 U.S. 37 (1951), in which the court, in finding mandamus available, refused
to accept an official's determination of his statutory duty. Id. at 148. Although the
Supreme Court reversed this decision upon appeal because the Court disagreed with
the circuit court's construction of the statute, it did not criticize the lower court's
refusal to accept the official's view of a statute which was clearly open to differing
interpretations. Robertson v. Chambers, 341 U.S. 37 (1951).
49. See notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text supra.
50. See notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
51. Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (codified in 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1361, 1391(e) (1970)).
52. Section 1391(e) provides several choices of venue in such actions against
federal officials. The action may be brought within any judicial district in which (1)
a defendant resides; (2) the cause of action arose; (3) any real property involved
in the action is situated; (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the

action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1970).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
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outside of the District, it was not clear whether mandamus jurisdiction
under section 1361 was broader in scope than the common law writ
of mandamus. Decisional law since the enactment of section 1361
has suggested at least a partial solution to this question. In this section,
the author traces the development of this statutory successor to the
common law writ of mandamus and assesses its potential applicability
as a tool for judicial review and control of administrative action,
concluding that: 1) the availability of an action "in the nature of
mandamus '5 4 under section 1361 need no longer be determined solely
by strict adherence to the common law ministerial-discretionary distinction, being based instead upon a broader inquiry into the authority
granted to the defendant-official; 2) infringement of a plaintiff's
constitutional rights by a defendant-official is sufficient to invoke
mandamus jurisdiction such that the plaintiff may be afforded affirmative relief to rectify the constitutional deprivation.
A. Legislative History of Section 1361
The primary reason behind the enactment of section 1361 was
decentralization of judicial review for those litigants seeking affirmative relief against federal officials. 5 However, the exact nature of the
relief authorized by that statute remains a matter of dispute.5 ' In
an attempt to delineate the scope of mandamus jurisdiction under
section 1361, courts and commentators have analyzed its rather complex legislative history, and have generally concluded that "relief in
the nature of mandamus" was intended to encompass mandamus principles developed in the District of Columbia federal courts57 and created
no new remedies."' A brief sketch of the legislative history of section
1361 will reveal the reasons for this conclusion.
54. Id.
55. Letter from Nicholas D. Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney General, to John A.
Carroll, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Comm., Sept. 18, 1962, in 108 CONG. REC.
20079 (1962); SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, JURISDICTION AND VENUE OF
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS IN ACTIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, S. REP.
No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962) [hereinafter cited as JURISDICTION AND
VENUE REPORT]. See also K. C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 23.10, at 807
(Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
56. The Fourth Circuit noted that it was not clear "[w]hether the purview of
the common law writ of mandamus was broadened by the inclusion of the words 'in
the nature of' before the word 'mandamus' . . . or whether Congress meant only to
make the writ available at common law." Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877, 880 & n.5
(4th Cir. 1973).
57. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 1, at 313-18; Jurisdictional Basis, supra note 1,
at 123, 125.
58. Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364, 367
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966) ; White v. Administrator of General
Serv. Adm'n, 343 F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1965); JURISDICTION AND VENUE REPORT,
supra note 55, at 2; Byse & Fiocca, supra note 1, at 319; JurisdictionalBasis, supra

note 1, at 125.
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As initially introduced, section 1361 contained no reference to
mandamus actions; it merely provided that "[t] he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any action to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform his
duty." 9 However, the Justice Department cautioned that the provisions of the bill were "dangerously broad"" ° and suggested that the
section "refer to the 'mandamus' power and specifically limit its exercise to ministerial duties owed to the plaintiff."'" Ultimately the
Senate approved the Senate Judiciary Committee's version of the bill "
without including the language suggested by the Justice Department.0 '
When the House of Representatives acted upon the Senate's amendments, the Justice Department renewed one of its original objections,
insisting that the legislation contain at least a reference to mandamus. 4
The wording of the section referring to actions "in the nature of mandamus" represents the compromise necessitated by the Justice Department's intervention.
The Senate Report clearly indicates that the legislators intended
the mandamus principles developed in the federal courts of the District of Columbia to govern the scope of the remedy provided in
section 1361.05 It should be noted, however, that the statutory grant
of section 1361 does not qualify the type of duty which must be found
before mandamus jurisdiction is established. Indeed, Congress rejected those amendments which proposed to include a "ministerial"
and "discretionary" distinction, since that distinction had proven so
59. 106 CONG. REC. 18405-06 (1960) (emphasis added).
60. For a letter from Byron S. White, Deputy Attorney General, to the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Feb. 28, 1962, see JURISDICTION AND VENUE
REPORT, supra note 55, at 5-7.

61. Id. at 6. The Justice Department submitted a proposal which provided:
The district courts shall have jurisdiction of any action in the nature of

mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or of any agency
thereof to perform a ministerial duty owed to the plaintiff under a law of the
United States.

Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
62. 108 CONG. REC. 18783 (1962).
63. JURISDICTION AND VENUE REPORT, supra note 55, at 5-7.
Committee's version provided:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
duty owed to the plaintiff or to make a decision in any

The Senate Judiciary
any action to compel
thereof to perform a
matter involving the

exercise of discretion.

Id. (emphasis added).
64. For the letter from Nicholas D. Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney General, to
John A. Carroll, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Comm., on Sept. 18, 1962, see 108
CONG. REc. 20079 (1962).
65. JURISDICTION AND VENUE REPORT, supra note 55, at 2. See also 108 CONG.
REC. 18783 (1962), where the Justice Department's suggestion to include the phrase
"[jurisdiction] concurrent with that of the District Court for the District of Columbia"
was rejected by the House as "unnecessary and cumbersome." Id.
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bothersome in the past.0 6 Likewise, the District of Columbia courts,
recognizing that the distinction possessed little utility, had occasionally
relaxed the ministerial requirement as a prerequisite

for finding

mandamus jurisdiction prior to the enactment of section 1361.67
Surely the insertion of the language "in the nature of mandamus" was
8
not intended to resurrect that dichotomy.
B.

Decisional Law Under Section 1361

1. Broadening the Scope of the Inquiry
While many courts still frame the issue of mandamus jurisdiction in terms of "ministerial" or "discretionary" acts," other courts,
cognizant of the rapid growth of the federal bureaucracy, have developed a more liberal concept of mandamus jurisdiction.7" For example, although language in the leading case of Decatur v. Paitlding"
indicated that a writ of mandamus should not issue where administrators are discharging the ordinary duties of their offices, this concept
has been refined. Most statutes which create an administrative or
executive office require some interpretation by the public officer of
the duties which are part of the office. The fact that a statute may
66. JURISDICTION AND VENUE REPORT, supra note 55, at 4. Professor Davis has
stated that the ministerial-discretionary distinction is "undesirable, unworkable, and
without practical justification." 3 DAvis, supra note 55, § 23.11, at 356 (1958).
67. See notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
68. The initial concern expressed by some was that the courts would adopt the
narrower mandamus tradition relating to ministerial obligations under section 1361
instead of relying upon the more liberal equitable injunction tradition to control
discretion developed later by the District of Columbia courts. See Byse & Fiocca,
supra note 1, at 318.
69. E.g., Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966), where the court stated:
Before such a writ may issue, it must appear that the claim is clear and certain
and the duty of the officer involved must be ministerial, plainly described, and
peremptory.
Id. at 367, citing Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206 (1934). Other
recent cases in which the court employed the rigid "ministerial-discretionary" distinction include Short v. Murphy, 512 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Walker, 409 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1969) ; Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 392 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Raitport v. Small Business Adm'n,
380 F. Supp. 1059 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Sansom Comm'n v. Lynn, 366 F. Supp. 1271 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
70. E.g., Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277, 279 (1st Cir. 1965); Martin v.
Schlesinger, 371 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
In Ashe, the court never discussed the ministerial-discretionary dichotomy
and simply stated that the new section 1361 allowed the bringing of the suit, whereas
it might have been difficult to do so previously. 355 F.2d at 279. In Martin, the
court held mandamus available to those seeking performance by defendants who had
a clear duty to so perform, in circumstances where no other relief was available.
371 F. Supp. at 640, citing Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877 (1973). See generally
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 33, at 1381; Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of
Federal Executive Action, 36 GEo. L.J. 287 (1948).
71. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840) ; see note 38 supra.
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require administrative (or judicial) construction to clarify the created
duties does not mean that the duty is not ministerial, nor that mandamus is not proper in such a case to compel an officer to perform the
duty once it is determined. 2 Thus, while a federal administrative
officer may invoke statutory language in characterizing the exercise
of the duties of an office as discretionary, it was determined even
prior to the enactment of section 1361 that such manipulation would
not be permitted to circumvent access to the courts:
Executive officers cannot . . . create an area of doubt and
dispute which will be outside the established power of the judiciary to compel obedience to a clear mandate of the Congress.
They cannot by bootstraps manufactured by them lift themselves
out of the [mandamus] jurisdiction of the courts.73
Limited interpretations of language will not defeat a writ of mandamus
even when the ministerial-discretionary dichotomy is employed as a
test of mandamus jurisdiction. As will be illustrated by the cases
outlined in following sections, the courts now carefully scrutinize the
minimal duty that a federal administrator is obliged to perform and
decide on that basis if a writ of mandamus will issue to require fulfillment of the duties in accordance with statutory and/or constitu74
tional requirements.
In addition to evaluating the minimal duty required by statute,
the actions of federal administrators are closely scrutinized whenever
a mandamus action is instituted for a second reason. In deciding
whether the court possesses jurisdiction under section 1361, a court
must first consider the merits of the case to determine if a duty
exists on the part of the defendant sought to be compelled to perform
some act. The court assumes jurisdiction preliminarily, to determine
whether mandamus jurisdiction is appropriate. This process was
explained by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit as follows:
In mandamus actions, the usually separate questions of jurisdiction and failure-to-state-a-claim merge. There can be no
72. See, e.g., Carey v. Local Bd. No. 2, 297 F. Supp. 252 (D.C. Conn.), aff'd,
412 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1969).
73. Clackamas County, Ore. v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
vacated as moot, 349 U.S. 909 (1955). This general principle had been recognized
by the Supreme Court as early as 1900, as is evidenced by the Court's opinion in
Roberts v. United States, 176 U.S. 221 (1900). There the Court stated:
Every statute to some extent requires construction by the public officer whose
duties may be defined therein. Such officer must read the law, and he must therefore, in a certain sense, construe it, in order to form a judgment from its language
what duty he is directed by the statute to perform. But that does not necessarily
and in all cases make the duty of the officer anything other than a purely ministerial one.
Id. at 231. For a discussion of Roberts, see notes 41 & 42 and accompanying text supra.
74. See notes 92-95 & 133-37 and accompanying text infra.
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mandamus jurisdiction if no "duty" exists on the part of the
defendants. On the other hand, if a duty does exist, then not
only is there jurisdiction under § 1361 but plaintiff has also
adequately stated a claim in asking that such duty be fulfilled. 5
Thus, in a mandamus action, the court undertakes a closer examination of the facts and circumstances of a case than would normally be
undertaken in deciding a jurisdictional issue. Therefore, a study of
the mandamus action requires a detailed discussion of the factual
situations with which the courts have been presented.
2. Mandamus to Correct An Abuse of Discretion

Under the current law of mandamus, the writ is available to
control abuses of discretion as well as to compel performance of purely
ministerial duties. 76 One of the earliest cases to recognize this aspect
of the federal mandamus tradition was Work v. United States ex rel.
Rives. 77 In that case, the Supreme Court denied relief, stating that

mandamus would not issue to compel the discharge of a duty which
was wholly within the official's discretion. Nonetheless, the Court
7
noted in dicta that "the duty may be discretionary within limits," 1
and that federal officials can be controlled by mandamus if those limits
are transgressed. 7 This concept was not fully utilized, however, until
after the enactment of section 1361, when the lower federal courts
began to grant relief based upon the principle of curtailing the scope
of administrative discretion.
For example, a number of courts have granted relief under the
federal mandamus statute where an abuse of discretion was discovered
in an agency's promulgation of regulations which did not conform to
the congressional purpose in enacting the relevant legislation. 0 In
75. Davis Associates, Inc. v. Secretary, Dep't of HUD, 498 F.2d 385, 388 (lst
Cir. 1974).
76. E.g., Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1925) (dicta);
State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1104-05 (8th Cir. 1973) ; Peoples
v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561, 564-65 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United
States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371, 374 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 929 (1969) ; Drew v. Larrimore, 380 F.2d 479 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 974 (1967). But see Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.C.
1972) (section 1361 mandamus action not proper remedy to challenge abuse of discretion) ; Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Comm'n v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238, 243
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
77. 267 U.S. 175 (1925).
78. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. Brown v. Lynn, 385 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Bailey v. Romney, 359
F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1972). In Bailey, the plaintiffs successfully used section 1361
as a basis for challenging regulations governing reimbursements to be made to home
owners for repair of defects in homes insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Id. at 599. Jurisdiction was also found to exist under the APA and
section 1331(a). Id. at 598-99; see text accompanying notes 98-101 infra.
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Brown v. Lynn"l the plaintiff mortgagors attacked, inter alia, guidelines promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) pursuant to the mortgage assistance and mortgage
insurance programs of the National Housing Act,"2 contending that
such guidelines failed to protect sufficiently the interest of the mortgagors. 8 The district court found that HUD's failure to formulate
adequate guidelines and to make them obligatory upon the administrators was an abuse of discretion! 4 The court reasoned that in leaving
the wronged mortgagor without means of redress, the HUD policies
had "forced foreclosures rather than taking action to prevent them,""5
contrary to the congressional purpose in enacting the Housing Program.
The full scope of a court's power under section 1361 to review
administrative acts deemed to be abuses of discretion was perhaps best
demonstrated by Bennett v. Butz."0 In Bennett, the outreach program
administered by the Department of Agriculture to inform low income
87
persons of the Food Stamp Program was found to be inadequate.
The court closely scrutinized the program, which had been instituted
by the Department of Agriculture, to ascertain whether it complied
with the requirements of the statute and the intent of Congress.
Although the court acknowledged that the Secretary had broad discretion in the implementation of the program, the Secretary was found
to have abused this discretion by implementing a program which
the court deemed inadequate to fulfill the duties imposed upon him
by statute.8 8 Indeed, Bennett is a graphic illustration of the expansion
of judicial control over administrative and executive actions through
intense examination of the officials' actions. Significantly, this scrutiny
often involves, as in Bennett, the making of rather subjective value
judgments by the courts.
Another series of cases has dealt with the issue of whether the
Federal Housing Authority (FHA) had a duty to the purchasers of
federally insured homes to warrant the condition of those homes
81. 385 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ill. 1974).

82. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1709, 1715z (1970).
83. 385 F.Supp. at 989.
84. Id. at 989-99.
85. Id. at 1000.
86. 386 F. Supp. 1059 (D. Minn. 1974). Jurisdiction was found under both sections 1337 and 1361. Id. at 1063.
87. 386 F. Supp. at 1066.
88. Id. at 1067. See also Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973),
where the Secretary of Agriculture unilaterally terminated an emergency farm loan
program 6 months prior to the previously announced termination date without giving notice to potential applicants. To the extent that the Secretary had authority to
terminate the program, the court held that doing so without notice was an abuse of
discretion. Id. at 157.
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before approving a loan guarantee under the provisions of the National
Housing Act. 9 Mandamus was used primarily to challenge certain
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of HUD on the theory that
the Secretary had acted outside the scope of his statutory mandate in
issuing such rules. 90 A second potential use of the federal mandamus
statute, suggested in Jackson v. Romney,9 I is to compel the FHA
to inspect homes prior to the approval of sale, thereby assuring compliance with the relevant local housing codes. Both the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Davis v. Romney92 and the District
Court for the District of Columbia in Bailey v. Romney93 found in
certain provisions of the National Housing Act94 an affirmative duty
owed by the FHA to the purchasers of federally insured homes to
ensure such compliance.9 5 Yet the jurisdictional section employed
in each of the two cases varied. In Davis, the Third Circuit found
jurisdiction existing under section 1337 of title 28 of the United
States Code,9 6 a statutory grant encompassing actions arising under
any act which regulates commerce. 97 In Bailey, however, jurisdiction
was found under the APA 8 section 1361," 9 and section 1331 (a) ;0
jurisdiction under section 1337 was not alleged in Bailey. The district court based the section 1361 mandamus jurisdiction on the
Secretary of HUD's duty to promulgate regulations consistent with
the statutory mandate.'
A line of cases involving United States military officials further
illustrates the utilization of section 1361 to curb abuses of discretion.
89. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (1970).
90. Jackson v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub. noa., Jackson
v. Lynn, 506 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Bailey v. Romney, 359 F. Supp. 596
(D.D.C. 1972).
91. 355 F. Supp. 737, 741-42. The court found that no claim was stated upon
which relief could be granted and did not elaborate upon the sources of potential
jurisdiction. Id. at 742.
Shortly after this decision, HUD changed its procedure to require compliance
with housing codes as a prerequisite to the issuance of mortgage insurance, thus rendering the issue moot. Jackson v. Lynn, 506 F.2d 233, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
92. 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974).
93. 359 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1972).
94. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1715b, 17151(d) (2), 1715z (1970).
95. 490 F.2d at 1368; 359 F. Supp. at 599-600.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
97. 490 F.2d at 1365.
98. 359 F. Supp. at 598. The APA was also the basis for jurisdiction in Jackson
v. Lynn, 506 F.2d 233, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Jackson, jurisdiction had been alleged
in the district court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 1346(a) (2), 1361 (1970) and under
5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1970). All of these bases for jurisdiction had been rejected
by the trial court. Jackson v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 737, 739-41 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd
sub noma., Jackson v. Lynn, 506 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
99. 359 F. Supp. at 599.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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As the American military involvement in Southeast Asia escalated
in the mid-1960's, mandamus became an important tool for those
seeking relief from directives of military personnel, military courtsmartial, and decisions of the ancillary branches of the military - the
Veterans' Administration and the Selective Service System. Expansion of the use of mandamus in these areas occurred primarily due
to the existence of statutory preclusions 1°2 to civilian court intervention
into decisions of the military' 03 and the Veterans' Administration." 4
Even where no express statutory preclusion of review existed,
civilian courts have traditionally been reluctant to impose their judgment of proper action upon military officials, especially in areas involving discretionary determinations. 10 Yet some courts have recognized that mandamus may issue upon a sufficient showing that the
military conduct challenged constituted an abuse of discretion.1 0 6
What constitutes a sufficient demonstration of abuse is far from
clear, however. In United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding
Officer,"' the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit commented
that "official conduct may have gone so far beyond any rational
exercise of discretion as to call for mandamus even when the action
is within the letter of the authority granted."'0 8 Despite this language,
the court declined to review the defendant's allegedly arbitrary refusal
to exempt the plaintiff from active duty on the ground that it would
excessively delay the activation of reservists by the military. 0 9 Two
years after Schonbrun, a New York district court, in issuing a writ
of mandamus to a military official, stated that "[i] t is ... well established that mandamus may be used to correct an abuse of discretion
by a federal officer, particularly if the abuse constitutes a violation
Yet the Second Circuit afforded much
of constitutional rights.""
102. See note 214 and accompanying text infra.
103. See, e.g., Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 460(b) (3)
(Supp. V, 1975).
104. 38U.S.C. §211(a) (1970).
105. In Jarrett v. Resor, 426 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1970), the court denied jurisdiction under section 1361 to challenge an allegedly arbitrary denial by the military of
the plaintiff's petition for a discharge from the Army, since the plaintiff had alleged
at most an abuse of discretion. Id. at 216-17.
106. See notes 107-11 and accompanying text infra.
107. 403 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 929 (1969).
108. Id. at 374. The Second Circuit reaffirmed the Schonbrun standard as the
applicable legal standard in Casarino v. United States, 431 F.2d 775, 777 (2d Cir. 1970),
but found the facts of that case did not warrant its application.
109. 403 F.2d at 374-75.
110. Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 812 (E.D.N.Y.), rezld, 447 F.2d 245
2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972).
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deference to the military in reversing the decision.'
In 1974, a
Colorado district court dismissed a complaint containing allegations
that the plaintiff had been transferred for exercising his first amendment rights because there was "no adequate showing of such an abuse
of discretion as to warrant interference [with commands of military
officers] by a civilian court."' 1 2 This leads to the conclusion that,
while mandamus jurisdiction over the military can theoretically be
invoked to correct an abuse of discretion, proving abuse to the satisfaction of a court may pose an almost insurmountable barrier to
obtaining relief under section 1361.
Courts have consistently found jurisdiction under section 1361 to
compel the military to follow their own regulations and to compel
corrective action when regulations have been violated. This conclusion has been justified, inter alia, on the basis that a failure to follow
prescribed regulations deprives the plaintiff of due process, 113 violates
a duty owed to the plaintiff," 4 or constitutes an abuse of discretion." 5
In addition to the utilization of mandamus to attack an administrator's abuse of discretion, the issuance of the writ is occasionally
based upon a second rationale - that the officer has acted completely
outside the scope of authority granted by the statute or regulation.
As the following cases illustrate, it is often difficult to distinguish this
basis for issuance of a writ of mandamus from the situation in which
discretion is in fact granted but is wrongly exercised; yet the two
are separate grounds for decision.
The case of North City Area-Wide Council v. Romney"" involved the requirement of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan
Development Act" ' that the Model Cities programs include widespread citizen participation in order to qualify for federal funding." 8
North City Area-Wide Council (AWC) brought suit against HUD,
111. Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163, 166 (D. Colo. 1974). The plaintiff
alleged that he had written letters to various members of Congress and, as a result,
had been removed mid-year from a teaching assignment at the Air Force Academy
and reassigned elsewhere. Id. at 164.

112. Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245, 254-55 (2d Cir. 1971).
113. See Konn v. Laird, 460 F.2d 1318, 1319 (7th Cir. 1972) ; Smith v. Resor, 406

F.2d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1969).

114. E.g., Colson v. Bradley, 477 F.2d 639, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1973).
115. See Feliciano v. Laird, 426 F.2d 424, 427 (2d Cir. 1970) ; Schatten v. United
States, 419 F.2d 187, 191-92 (6th Cir. 1969).
Similarly, courts have compelled draft boards to comply with their own regulations, e.g.,
Grosfeld v. Morris, 448 F.2d 1004, 1010-12 (4th Cir. 1971), and with
statutory requirements. See Carey v. Local Bd. No. 2, 297 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn.),
aff'd per curiam, 412 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1969) ; Armendariz v. Hershey, 295 F. Supp.
1351 (W.D. Tex. 1969).

116. 428 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1970).
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301 et seq. (1970).
118. 428 F.2d at 755.
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alleging that HUD had violated the requirements of the Act by
approving the operation of the Philadelphia Model Cities Program,
even though the AWC had been removed from its position as the
citizen board. The Philadelphia Director of the Model Cities program
was held to have acted outside the scope of her authority in unilaterally
removing AWC from representation." 9 Jurisdiction was based upon
sections 1331, 1361, and the APA."2 °
Similarly, in State Highway Commission v. Volpe, 2' the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a decision of the district
court in which a writ of mandamus was issued under section 1361
compelling the release of funds impounded by the Department of
Transportation. 122 While the court ruled that the action for mandamus
was moot since the funds had been released, the court noted in dictum
that mandamus would otherwise have been proper since the Secretary
had not been delegated the power to withhold funds for anti-inflationary purposes. 1 2 ' In other words, the impoundment was wholly
outside the scope of the Secretary's authority.
3. Mandamus to Compel an Exercise of Discretion
While actions in the nature of mandamus under section 1361
124
may not be brought to influence an official's exercise of discretion,
mandamus may be used to compel an exercise of discretion when an
official is required by statute to render a decision as part of the duties
of the office.' 25 In Rothgeb v. Statts,1 20 federal employees brought an
action for overtime pay, alleging jurisdiction under section 1361.127
The court stated that mandamus could not be used to compel payment
of sums out of the public treasury, but declared that mandamus would
lie to compel the Government to rule on whether or not the plaintiffs
1 28
were entitled to the overtime pay.
119. Id. at 758. The same factual situation was appealed two years later as North
City Area-Wide Council v. Romney, 456 F.2d 811 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 963
(1972). The Third Circuit held that the AWC must be consulted by the city concerning any changes which were made in the program. Id. at 818.
120. Id. at 757.
121. 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
122. Id. at 1104.
123. Id. at 1104 & n.5.
124. McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608, 611 (10th Cir. 1971).
125. Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218 (1930) ; Work v.
United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 184 (1925) ; Udall v. Taunah, 398 F.2d 795,
798 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Nebbia, 357 F.2d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 1966);
Guffanti v. Hershey, 296 F. Supp. 553, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (dicta); Hill v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 257 F. Supp. 129, 130 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
126. 56 F.R.D. 559 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
127. Id. at 561. Plaintiffs were employees of the Internal Revenue Service
assigned to the Sky Marshall Project to protect crews and passengers on international
flights. Id. at 560.
128. Id. at 561-62.
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Jurisdiction under section 1361 has also been found where the
plaintiff demonstrated that an agency or other organization has failed
to adhere to its own prescribed regulations. 129 Thus in Feliciano v.
Laird130 the Second Circuit held that where the United States Army
deviated from its own regulations in considering an enlisted man's
application for a hardship discharge and arbitrarily disapproved the
application, mandamus would issue to require Army officials to re3
consider the application properly in a de novo proceeding.' ' The
line of cases employing this rationale may provide a model for the
creative use of mandamus to obtain compliance with minimal due
process requirements in other governmental agencies and organi-

zations.

13 2

4. Protection Against Infringement of Constitutional Rights
Several decisions rendered since the enactment of section 1361
indicate that a writ of mandamus will issue even where a federal
officer is clearly vested with discretion in the performance of the
particular official duties, if it can be shown that the official has violated
the constitutional rights of a person subject to agency action. Hence,
in Murray v. Vaughn,13 3 the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island held that jurisdiction existed under section
1361 to challenge a concededly discretionary government action when
the action had violated the plaintiff's first amendment rights. Plaintiff
Murray had been expelled from the Peace Corps for publishing a
letter in a Chilean newspaper criticizing United States policy in Viet34 He
nam and the policy of the Peace Corps against such criticism.
filed suit seeking, inter alia, mandamus commanding the Director of
the Peace Corps to reinstate him in the Peace Corps and to remove
35 The
all reference to his expulsion from his employment records.
129. See cases cited at notes 113-15 supra.
130. 426 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1970).
131. Id. at 427-29. The relevant regulation provides that if the application for
hardship discharge does not contain conclusive evidence upon which a decision may be
based, the application and supporting evidence must be forwarded to the Director of
Selective Service of the state in which the individual's local draft board is situated.
Noting that the Army is bound by its own regulations, the court found that a duty
existed by virtue of the regulation to forward the application unless it presented a clear
case for rejection. The duty imposed by regulation was deemed sufficient to support
mandamus jurisdiction. Id. at 429.
132. See Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973). The court ordered
the Secretary of Agriculture to review applications for emergency loans even though
the Secretary could not be required to grant loans to everyone who applied. Id. at
151. The loan program had been terminated without notice in violation of agency
regulation and due process of law. Id.
133. 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969).
134. Id. at 692.
135. Id. at 693-94.
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court conceded that the President had discretionary authority, which
he delegated to the Director of the Peace Corps, enabling the Director
to terminate the employment of any Peace Corps member. Yet the
court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the case, stating that "if
these defendants, in exercising that discretion, violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff, they cannot avoid § 1361 jurisdiction." '
The Murray court explained its holding as follows:
Unquestionably, mandamus will not compel an officer to do
a "discretionary" act. Yet, the pivotal inquiry must be directed
at the permissible scope of the officer's discretion, for that discretion iscircumscribed by constitutional, statutory, and regulatory strictures.
* .* Just as federal officers are not immune from suit where
they exceed their powers and violate the Constitution, so also
are they susceptible of suit under § 1361 when they exceed their
powers and violate the Constitution.3 7
Thus it is evident that the finding of a clear duty to act on the
part of a defendant officer no longer need be grounded upon a statutory
prescription. Rather, a duty sufficient to invoke mandamus jurisdiction may be based upon the Constitution, without regard to the
statute creating an office.
Several additional cases have recognized that jurisdiction may
exist under section 1361 to provide relief for plaintiffs whose constitu136. Id. at 697. In a subsequent hearing, the court held that the Peace Corps

Director had violated the plaintiff's first amendment rights and failed to follow the
Peace Corps' own policy directive regarding termination of members. The court,
therefore, ordered the Director to remove from plaintiff's employment record any
document relating to his expulsion and to recompute the reassignment allowance given
plaintiff. Murray v. Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038, 1059 (D.R.I. 1969).
After his expulsion from the Peace Corps, Murray had been reclassified I-A
by his local draft board. In addition to seeking relief from the Director of the Peace
Corps, the plaintiff also requested that mandamus issue to compel his reclassification
back to the II-A status which he had been classified while a member of the Peace
Corps. Under the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 460(b) (3)
(Supp. V, 1975), selective service classification may not usually be challenged except
in a defense to a criminal prosecution for refusing induction. The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that a plausible claim of a constitutional violation could allow
the court to assume jurisdiction to review the draft board's action. 300 F. Supp. at 700.
137. 300 F. Supp. at 696-97 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). For other
cases involving the use of mandamus to correct an abuse of discretion amounting to
a violation of constitutional rights see CCCO-Western Region v. Fellows, 359 F.
Supp. 644, 647-48 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (dicta); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797,
812 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965
(1972). But see Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), where the court stated that there are occasions of deprivations of
constitutional rights where satisfaction of mandamus requirements might be viewed
liberally. Even with the most liberal interpretation, however, the court must have
the benefit of some specific statutes or regulations against which to measure duties
said to have been specifically ignored by the defendant. Id. at 242-43.
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tional rights have been violated by military personnel. Significantly,
such jurisdiction has been recognized even where civilian court review
of the military's action was apparently precluded by statute or case
law.

138

In 1965, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Ashe v.
McNamara3 determined that the district court had jurisdiction under
section 1361 to review the refusal of the Secretary of Defense to
change the administrative record of plaintiff's military discharge from
dishonorable to honorable. 4 ° The plaintiff's dishonorable discharge
had resulted from his conviction at a court-martial during which the
plaintiff had manifestly been denied the effective assistance of counsel - a deprivation which violated petitioner's rights under the sixth
amendment. 4 ' Initially, the plaintiff attempted to have his military
records corrected through the military justice appeals system, but
upon failing to obtain the desired correction, he sought an order
compelling the correction through a section 1361 action. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the ground
that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.' 42
On appeal, however, since the military authorities had consistently
refused without justification to rectify the effect of the deprivation of
Ashe's constitutional rights, the First Circuit remanded the case to
the district court instructing that an order be issued requiring the
3
change of plaintiff's discharge to an honorable one.'1
In 1971, the Second Circuit in Cortright v. Resor'". affirmed
the district court's finding of jurisdiction under section 1361 to hear
a challenge to the transfer of Army personnel allegedly resulting from
the plaintiff's exercise of his first amendment rights. In a show of
deference to the military, however, the court reexamined the facts and
138. See notes 216-19 and accompanying text infra.
139. 355 F.2d 277 (lst Cir. 1965).
140. Id. at 279. In 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1970), the Secretary's powers are
described:
The Secretary of a military department, under procedures established by him and
approved by the Secretary of Defense . . . may correct any military record of
that department when he considers it necessary to correct an error or remove
an injustice.
Id.
The court noted that, under section 1552, the records of a discharge may be
changed even if the discharge were ordered at a court-martial, 355 F.2d at 280,
despite the following provision in the Uniform Code of Military Justice:
The appellate review of records of trial . . . the proceedings, findings, and sentences of courts-martial . . . and all dismissals and discharges carried into execution under sentences by courts-martial . . . are final and conclusive.

10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970).
141. 355 F.2d at 279-80.
142. Ashe v. McNamara, 243 F. Supp. 243, 244 (D. Mass. 1965).
143. 355 F.2d at 282.
144. 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976

21

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

21: p. 637

rejected the district court's finding that the plaintiff had in fact been
transferred for signing and circulating a petition against the Vietnam
war. 145 Consequently, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's
order that plaintiff be reinstated in his former position. 14 In so
deciding, however, the court cautioned that it was not holding that
a civilian court could never interfere with a military transfer order
or prescribe relief to prevent abridgement of first amendment rights,
noting that "the Army has a large scope in striking a proper balance
between servicemen's assertions of the right of protest and the maintenance of the effectiveness of military units .... 1-147
In Burnett v. Tolson,14s the Fourth Circuit recognized that an
alleged denial of first amendment rights by the commanding general
of Fort Bragg could form the basis for jurisdiction under section 1361.
The commanding general had prohibited the distribution of antiwar
leaflets in the public areas of the military base.' 49 Rejecting the contention that such a decision lay within the commanding general's
discretion, the Fourth Circuit found instead that he had a ministerial
duty to allow the orderly expression of ideas in these areas. 50 Since
jurisdiction under section 1331 was doubtful, the court concluded
5
that section 1361 provided the only available adequate remedy,' '
thereby reversing the district court's dismissal for lack of juris2
diction.'1

Jurisdiction has also been found to exist under section 1361 to
challenge Navy grooming regulations, allowing wigs for bald members of the Navy Reserves but arbitrarily prohibiting short hair
wigs on long-haired reservists in violation of fifth amendment due
process rights.' 5 Long-haired reservists brought suit in Etheridge
v. Schlesinger.. to prevent their being activated to regular military
145. Id. at 247-49, 254-55.
146. Id. at 255.
147. Id. at 254-55. Even though the limitation on the military implied in this
quote is very slight, it appears to offer more possibility for civilian review of the
military under section 1361 than existed prior to the enactment of that statute. In 1953,
in Orloff v. Willoughby, the United States Supreme Court stated:
While the courts have found occasion to determine whether one has been lawfully inducted and is therefore within the jurisdiction of the Army and subject
to its orders, we have found no case where this Court has assumed to revise
duty orders as to one lawfully in the service.

345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
148. 474 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1973).
149. Id. at 879.
150. Id. at 882.
151. Id. at 879-80.
152. Id. at 883.
153. Etheridge v. Schlesinger, 362 F. Supp. 198, 201 (E.D. Va. 1973).

154. Id. at 198.
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duty as a result of alleged violations of the wig regulations."" The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
found that "those who seek performance of constitutional duties owed
them by defendants who have a clear duty to perform said duties and
where no other relief is available are within the scope of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361."' 5 The court, therefore, enjoined the defendant from ordering one plaintiff to active status and "mandatorily" instructed the
defendant to void another plaintiff's activation to regular duty. 1 '
Plaintiffs have used mandamus in actions to compel federal
officials to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard to tenants
of federally subsidized housing projects prior to increases in rent.
In Bloodworth v. Oxford Village Townhouses, Inc.,158 an action was
brought to force HUD officials to exercise more extensive control
over cooperative housing projects and to preclude the private organizers thereof from increasing rental payments until project residents
received notice and a hearing which comported with due process.' 59
The Bloodworth court found that mandamus jurisdiction existed as
to the federal defendants, and that pendent jurisdiction existed as to
the private defendants who were joined to the action as indispensable
parties. 6 °
155. Id. at 199.
156. Id. at 201.
157. Id. at 204.
158. Thomas v. Weinberger, 384 F. Supp. 540, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Brown v.
Weinberger, 382 F. Supp. 1092, 1096-97 (D. Md. 1974), aft'd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th
Cir. 1975) ; Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248, 254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Frost
v. Weinberger, 375 F. Supp. 1312, 1319 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
515 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1435 (1976) ; Elliott v. Weinberger,

371 F. Supp. 960, 968 (D. Hawaii 1974).
While
mitting review
least one case,
Dep't of Pub.

several cases have relied upon the federal mandamus statute in perof the determinations of the Social Security Administration, in at
jurisdiction was found under the authorizing act itself. Arizona State
Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405

U.S. 919 (1972). The court relied upon provisions for review contained in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1316(a) (1970).
It should be noted that one district court opinion viewed the challenged regulations as properly reviewable within the state court system, and denied federal court
relief. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal. Ramirez v.
Weinberger, 363 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 415 U.S. 970 (1974).
159. 377 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
160. Id. at 713. The extensive involvement of HUD in the development and
construction of cooperative housing projects was deemed sufficient federal action to
invoke the protection of the fifth amendment. Id. at 716.
For cases in which similar relief has been afforded under different jurisdictional statutes, see Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgages Inv., 504
F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974) ; Marshall v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 970 (1974). For cases in which such relief was denied on the merits,
see Paulson v. Coachlight Apts. Co., 507 F.2d 401 (6th Cir. 1974) ; People's Rights
Org. v. Bethlehem Associates, 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973), aff'g 356 F. Supp. 407
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Several cases have held that mandamus is available to attempt
to prevent the federal Social Security Administration from seeking
recoupment for overpayment of benefits from persons receiving public
assistance without affording the recipients a prior hearing.' 6 ' The
landmark decision of Goldberg v. Kelly 6 2 has had a significant impact upon all current litigation involving the termination and recoupment of federal welfare and social security benefits, and was relied
upon in several of the cases which found jurisdiction under section
1361.16 In Goldberg, the Supreme Court determined that welfare
recipients were entitled to a due process hearing prior to the termination of welfare benefits.'
Similarly, in Elliott v. Weinberger,'65 the District Court for the
District of Hawaii held that Social Security Administration procedures for recoupment of overpayments of old age and disability benefits
violated the fifth amendment's due process clause. 166 Recipients received inadequate notice both of the reason for recoupment and the
right to a reconsideration by the agency, and were not accorded a
hearing prior to reduction or suspension of benefits. 167 In Elliott,
jurisdiction was alleged under the APA, general federal question
jurisdiction of section 1331(a), and section 1361.168 While some
support existed for a finding of jurisdiction under the APA and section 1331(a), the court declined to rule as to those jurisdictional
issues." 9 Instead, the court concluded that mandamus jurisdiction
under section 1361 was most appropriate.
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971);
McKinney v. Washington, 442 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d
1243 (1st Cir. 1970).
161. 377 F. Supp. at 714, citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966).
162. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
163. Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960 (D. Hawaii 1974).
164. 397 U.S. at 264.
165. 371 F. Supp. 960 (D. Hawaii 1974).
166. Id. at 972-73. The holding of Elliott concerning the right to a hearing prior
to recoupment of overpayments in disability benefits must be reconsidered in light of
the recent Supreme Court decision of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
There the Court held that present Social Security Administration procedures comply
with due process and that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits, 424 U.S. at 349. The Mathews case does not affect the
jurisdictional holding regarding the proper use of mandamus under section 1361 in
cases where a constitutional duty does exist.
167. 371 F. Supp. at 973.
168. Id. at 967.
169. 371 F. Supp. at 967-68 n.21. The court noted that there was some dispute
concerning whether the APA is a jurisdictional grant independent of other statutes
and that the amount-in-controversy requirement might preclude section 1331 (a)
jurisdiction. Id.
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An understanding of the court's rationale in reaching this con.clusion is crucial, for the same reasoning has reappeared in several
recent cases granting relief from allegedly unconstitutional administrative action. 7 ° First, the court observed that although section 1361
was aimed at extending the availability of mandamus jurisdiction
beyond the rigid common law concepts, the facts of the case supported
jurisdiction even under the traditional restrictive rules. 171 Among the
elements required in common law mandamus actions was a showing
of "a clear duty on the part of the defendant to do the act in question.' 1 72 For the Elliott court, the finding of a duty to act did not
present the dilemma faced by the judiciary in the past, 17 for this
modern day court found that a duty existed whenever constitutional
rights were infringed by the action of the defendant-officer. 74 The
court observed that the duty arises whenever "the application of a
Supreme Court ruling to the instant case clearly shows the existence
of plaintiff's constitutional right and its denial by the defendant.' 75
In Mattern v. Weinberger, 76 the district court noted that, for
the purposes of jurisdiction under section 1361, there was no distinction between a statutory duty and a constitutional duty. 7 7 Thus
despite the fact that "neither the provisions of the [Social Security]
Act . . . nor the regulations promulgated thereunder compel the

Secretary to conduct a hearing prior to recoupment of an overpay79
ment,"' 178 mandamus was available to compel a due process hearing.
Mattern and Elliott are particularly significant in view of the fact
that many courts have in the past refused exercise of mandamus
jurisdiction because of the lack of a duty imposed on the defendant by
80

statute.1

The matrix below outlines the bases upon which federal court
jurisdiction has been afforded in several welfare recoupment cases. In
170. See cases cited in note 163 supra.

171. 371 F. Supp. at 967.

172. Id. at 967-68 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 968 n.22. See generally Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians
v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966).
174. 371 F. Supp. at 968.
175. Id. at 968 (citations omitted). There is similar language in Thomas v.
Weinberger, 384 F. Supp. 540, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). That court stated that "[i]f
the Social Security Administration is under a clear constitutional duty . . .to provide
an evidentiary hearing prior to the recoupment of overpayments, then that duty may
be enforced by mandamus." Id.
176. 377 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
177. Id. at 914.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218-19
(1930) ; Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364, 367
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966).
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the sampling of cases presented, all grants of relief have been afforded
under the mandamus statute or the authorizing statute itself. Deference
to the state trial court resulted in a denial of jurisdiction in one
action.' 8 ' The matrix outlines graphically the conclusion developed in
this section: when federal officials interfere with constitutionally protected rights - such as a pretermination due process hearing or the
free speech issue presented in the Murray case - the federal courts will
intervene and, through mandamus jurisdiction, direct the federal
officials to follow constitutional mandates.

APA

JURISDICTION
§ 1361
§ 1331(a)

Elliott v. Weinberger,
371 F. Supp. 960 (D. Hawaii 1974).

Y

X

Thomas v. Weinberger,
384 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y.

Y

X

1974).

Lyons v. Weinberger,
376 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y.

X

X

1974).

Frost v. Weinberger,
375 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D.N.Y. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 515
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 1435 (1976).

X

X

Brown v. Weinberger,
382 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1974).

Y

X

National Welfare Rights Organization v. Weinberger,

377 F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C.

X

§ 1343(3)

Y

X
X

X

1974).

KEY:
X-Jurisdiction found under this statute.
Y-Jurisdiction alleged under this statute; issue not determined by the court.

IV.

MODERN JURISDICTIONAL BASES FOR REVIEW OF
FEDERAL OFFICIAL ACTION

A petitioner seeking mandatory relief against an officer or employee of the United States may explore several potential jurisdictional
approaches. If the defendant's actions are attributable to an agency,
a provision in the statute creating the particular agency may expressly
grant jurisdiction to either federal district courts or to the courts of
As indiappeal to review determinations of the named agency.'
181. Ramirez v. Weinberger, 363 F. Supp. 105, 109 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 415
U.S. 970 (1974).
182. See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra.
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cated earlier, this statutory review approach will in most cases assure
review of the action or lack thereof on the part of the defendant.
Where statutory review is not available, however, review may be
sought under the more general review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act,18 3 or under section 1331 of title 28 of the United
States Code,1 1 4 provided a federal question is involved. As will be
demonstrated, however, mandatory relief against federal administrative
officials is sometimes unavailable under either of the foregoing jurisdictional bases. In such a case, section 1361 may become a litigant's
sole means of redress.
A.

Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act

Review of federal agency decisions standardized somewhat as a
result of the Administrative Procedure Act. 88 Section 10(a) of the
Act provides in pertinent part:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.'8

6

Under the APA, a federal court may force an agency to take action
which has been unlawfully refused or unreasonably delayed,' 7 and
may invalidate arbitrary agency action, action in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, action violating a constitutional right, or action constituting
an abuse of discretion.'8 8
183. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1970).
184. 28U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
185. For a brief discussion of the legislative history of the APA, see Jurisdictional Basis, supra note 1, at 108-15.
186. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
187. Id. § 706. Presumably this section would allow a court to compel mandatory
relief by requiring that action be taken to correct a Wrongful delay, thus providing
relief similar to that afforded under section 1361.
188. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). Section 10(e) provides that the court shall:
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld. or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, :power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to section
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to
trial de novo by the reviewing court.
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The APA, however, cannot be considered a panacea for those
seeking review of agency action for several reasons. First, the plaintiff
must obtain venue in a jurisdiction in which the APA has been held
to be an independent grant of jurisdiction,""9 or in the alternative
must establish jurisdiction under some other statute. 19 0 It is in those
jurisdictions in which the APA is not regarded as an independent
grant of jurisdiction that section 1361 may become crucial to the
plaintiff seeking review of federal administrative action.
The lower federal courts are hopelessly divided on the question
of the meaning of the APA "jurisdictional" grant,' and the Supreme
19
Court has consistently refused to rule on the question in the past. 2
Nor do the commentators agree in their assessments of the proper
resolution of the question. Certainly, the Mandamus and Venue Act
presently provides an alternate source of relief for petitioners, and the
future development of the writ of mandamus may affect the final
resolution of the issue of whether the APA is a jurisdictional grant
independent of any other statutory grant. Indeed, the strongest argument in favor of a finding that section 10 is jurisdictional is that a
person suffering legal wrong may not otherwise be able to secure
judicial review of that action. 19 3 If section 1361 is liberally construed
and creatively applied, the necessity of finding section 10 to be jurisdictional would be lessened.
In many instances, a particular factual situation will give rise
to jurisdiction under both the APA and section 1361."' Several such
189. See note 191 infra.
190. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970). Section 1337
provides that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or

proceedings arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting
trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies." Id. There is no amount-incontroversy requirement for section 1337; thus it might provide a jurisdictional basis
where section 1331 would not. See note 96 and accompanying text supra for a case

in which section 1337 was the jurisdictional grant relied upon in awarding affirmative relief.
191. Among the many cases from the six circuits which have held that the APA

is an independent jurisdictional grant are the following: Elton Orchards, Inc. v.

Brennan, 508 F.2d 493 (Ist Cir. 1974) ; Young v. United States, 498 F.2d 1211 (5th
Cir. 1974) ; Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971). The remaining four

circuits have held that section 10 does not independently confer jurisdiction. E.g.,

Grant v. Hogan, 505 F.2d 1220 (3d Cir. 1974); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090

(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974) ; Zimmerman v. United States,

422 F.2d 326 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970).

192. The Court has been presented with ample opportunity to rule on this question, but in each case has denied certiorari. See, e.g., Local 542 Operating Eng'rs
v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826 (1964).
193. See, e.g., Byse & Fiocca, supra note 1, at 329-30.

194. E.g., Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y.

1974); Frost v.

Weinberger, 375 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 515 F.2d

57 (1975).
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cases have arisen under the Model Cities program's'9l requirement
that there be widespread citizen participation in the program in order
for applicants to be eligible for federal assistance. 196 In another area,
the relationship between the APA and the Mandamus and Venue Act
is exemplified by Berends v. Butz. 9 7 In Berends, mandatory relief
was sought against the Secretary of Agriculture when he arbitrarily
terminated an emergency farm loan program in Minnesota in violation of the Department's own regulations and pronouncements. 19
The district court ordered a reinstatement of the program and a consideration of all the program and the loan applications properly
before the Department. In resolving the case, the court assumed
subject matter jurisdiction under section 1361 and, significantly,
adopted the scope of review of section 706 of the APA. 9 The case thus
illustrates an instance in which section 1361 would be most helpful to
a plaintiff seeking affirmative relief in a jurisdiction which holds that
the APA is not an independent jurisdictional grant.
Even if the petitioner is fortunate enough to have instituted his
action in a jurisdiction in which the APA is viewed as an independent
jurisdictional grant, persons "aggrieved" within the meaning of section 10 may still be unable to obtain relief under the APA. The
remedy provided therein is not available whenever "agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law"2 °° or when "statutes preclude
judicial review." 2 1 In these instances, section 1361 again may emerge
as a viable means for redress otherwise unobtainable.
1. Agency Action Committed by Law to. Agency Discretion
The mere fact that an agency and its officials are granted rather
broad discretionary powers does not automatically bring it within the
discretion exception to the review provisions2 0 2 of the APA. There
is a strong presumption that agency action is in fact reviewable 2°' and
the legislature's intent to vest an administrative official with absolute
195. Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3301 et seq. (1970).
196. E.g., North City Area-Wide Council v. Romney, 456 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 963 (1973); Rodriguez v. Barcelo, 358 F. Supp. 43 (D.P.R.
1973); Lower Kensington Civic Ass'n v. Watson, 330 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
Coalition for United Community Action v. Romney, 316 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
197. 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973).
198. Id. at 153.
199. Id. at 149.
200. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). For a discussion of the effect of the APA upon the
right to a review of agency action, see DAvIs, supra note 55, at § 28.08.
201. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
202. See id.
203. E.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) ; Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin,
428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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discretion must be clearly demonstrated." 4 Such demonstration must
be especially clear where it is alleged that agency action has deprived
the plaintiff of constitutional rights,2 °5 the agency has violated clear
statutory duties, or the agency has exceeded its statutory jurisdiction. 0 6
Upon a determination that review is unavailable under the APA, however, it is quite likely that review would be granted under section 1361,
207
to avoid depriving the petitioner of all modes of redress.
2. Statutory Preclusion of Review
Some statutes specifically provide that agency determinations
shall be final, thereby eliminating all recourse to judicial review. An
example of such a statute is the Veterans Benefits Act which provides
in pertinent part:
[T]he decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or
fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under any law
administered by the Veterans' Administration . . . shall be final

and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United
States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such
decision.... 208
Despite the presumption in favor of judicial review, provisions
such as the above have been held to prohibit absolutely review of
agency action under the aegis of the APA.2 0 9 Where no jurisdiction
exists under section 10(a), the inquiry becomes whether section 1361
will provide a basis for control of agency action. At least one case has
answered this question in the affirmative. In Atewooftakewa v.
Udall,21 the district court held that while there was some question
concerning the existence of jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Secretary of the Interior under the APA, there could be no doubt
that section 1361 provided a basis for jurisdiction "in order to effectu204. Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to
Agency Discretion," 82 HARv. L. REV. 367, 369-70 (1968).
205. Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1964); American Nursing
Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger, 387 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D. Ill. 1975).
206. United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 420 (1931); Work

v. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1924).
207. But cf. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 1, at 330.
208. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970) (emphasis added). The courts have consistently
held that this section precludes judicial review under the APA. Barefield v. Byrd,
320 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 928 (1964) ; Ford v. United States,
230 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Acker v. United States, 226 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1008 (1956)..
209. E.g., Balanyi v. Local 1031, IBEW, 374 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1967) (decision
of labor board not to issue unfair labor practice complaint unreviewable) ; Caulfield
v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 293 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1961), petition for cert.
dismissed, 369 U.S. 858 (1962); Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061
(N.D.W. Va. 1973); Gregory v. Freeman, 261 F. Supp. 362 (N.D.N.Y. 1966).
210. 277 F. Supp. 464 (W.D. Okla. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Toohnippah v. Hickel,
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ate the purposes of the [APA] by providing the review function which
the act contemplates." 2 '1 On appeal, the Supreme Court determined
that jurisdiction over the dispute could be premised exclusively upon
general federal question jurisdiction, 12 and found it unnecessary to
examine the validity of the district court's determination.2 13
The APA is unavailable as a jurisdictional base in many instances
where plaintiffs seek judicial review of actions by the military. Courtsmartial and military commissions are explicitly excluded from the
review provisions of the APA,2 14 and section 10(a) has been held to
be inapplicable to several aspects of military affairs through judicial
interpretation. 1 5 In Moore v. Schlesinger,21 6 for instance, the court
held that the APA was inapplicable to any proceeding under Article
138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice2 17 which provides for
internal review of actions by commanding officers upon the complaint
of a member of the armed forces. 21 ' The court suggested that jurisdiction would have been available under section 1361, however, if the
plaintiff had been -able to demonstrate "an abuse of the broad discretion granted to military officers in their command.

' 21 9

Conversely,

Bradley,2 0

the Eighth Circuit directed the district court
in Colson v.
to order the plaintiff's commanding officer to correctly review and
investigate an Article 138 complaint that had previously been submitted by the plaintiff. 22' That case, however, contained no discussion
of the jurisdictional issue.
B. Review Under Section 1331
General federal question jurisdiction, codified in section 1331 of
title 28 of the United States Code, provides another nonstatutory
basis for review of federal administrative action. Section 1331 reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
211. Id. at 465 n.1.
212. Toohnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 604 n.8 (1970), citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331

(1970).
213. 397 U.S. at 604 n.11; see Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th
Cir. 1975).
214. 5 U.s.C. § 701(b) (1)(f)(1970).
215. E.g., Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F.Supp. 163 (D.Colo. 1974).
216. Id.
217. 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1970).
218. 384 F. Supp. at 166.
219. Id. at 165-66 (dictum).
220. 477 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1973).
221. Id. at 642. For cases defining the availability of review for selective service
classification, see Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970);
Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968) ; Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys., 393
U.S. 233 (1968).
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value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.222
In suits to compel federal officers to perform their "duties" under
statute or the Constitution, the requirement of a "federal question"
is met without difficulty. However, a plaintiff seeking such relief may
find that the amount-in-controversy requirement prevents the court's
assumption of jurisdiction under section 1331.223 The problem is
particularly acute when the petitioner seeks affirmative relief or when
the "duty" sought to be enforced consists of a constitutional right
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant-officer.
Generally, the amount-in-controversy requirement is met by a
good faith allegation that the damages exceed the requisite amount.224
A more stringent burden must be met to establish jurisdiction where
the plaintiff is demanding equitable relief against a federal officer.
The standard employed varies; however, commentators who have
analyzed the case law in this area have concluded that "the plaintiff
must satisfy the court as to the objective facts" that support the allegation of jurisdictional amount.225 Where the plaintiff is seeking to
enforce a duty arising out of constitutionally guaranteed rights, meeting
this burden of proof poses substantial problems unless venue is obtained in a jurisdiction where constitutional rights are automatically
deemed to be worth more than

$10,000.226

Hence, the lack of an

amount-in-controversy requirement in section 1361 and the willingness
of the courts to utilize section 1361 to enforce constitutional rights227
may distinguish the Mandamus and Venue Act as the sole means of
obtaining relief.
V.

THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL MANDAMUS
AND

VENUE ACT

It is well established that Congress has the power to withhold
from the judiciary authority to review federal administrative determinations. 228 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of the United States
222. 28U.S.C.§1331(a) (1970).
223. It is clear that it is necessary to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction in section 1331 suits against federal officers. Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 547 (1972).
224. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89
(1938) ; Moore v. Betit, 511 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir. 1975).
225. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 33, at 1155.
226. Many cases have held that constitutional rights are by definition worth more
than $10,000. See Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 810 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971).
227. See notes 133-81 and accompanying text supra.
228. K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 513 (3d ed. 1972).
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has stated that legislative intent to preclude judicial review of administrative action adjudicating private rights is not to be lightly
inferred.2"' Indeed, there is a continuing struggle to delineate the
constitutional limits within which agency determinations may be
enforced against individuals prior to judicial review. 30 This debate
will persist as long as individuals wronged by agency officials' actions
are unable to obtain relief because no jurisdictional basis exists for
bringing an action against such federal officials. The purpose of the
enactment of the Mandamus and Venue Act was to provide such
jurisdiction and to make the mandamus remedy readily available to
all persons wronged by agency action. 2 3 1 Courts2 32 and commentators 23 3 alike have recognized that section 1361 should be liberally con-

strued in accordance with its avowed purpose.
Referring to their "rational law of mandamus," Professors Byse
and Fiocca have argued that the writ of mandamus should not be
constrained by the "ministerial-discretionary" dichotomy, but instead
should be infused with the equitable principles traditionally applied
in providing injunctive relief and review through declaratory judgment actions.2 34 Likewise, Professor Davis has observed that
[t]he fundamental choice is between mandamus tradition
and equity tradition. The law of mandamus is both positively
harmful and needlessly complex. Its doctrine rests upon technicalities growing out of needs of former generations; the technicalities have failed to adapt to the needs of a modern system
of judicial review ....
Equity tradition is simple and satisfactory . .

. [C]ourts

and counsel typically focus immediately upon merits of cases,
without interruption from procedural discord ....The mandatory
injunction . . . does not make availability or scope of review

dependent upon an undesirable and unworkable distinction between ministerial and discretionary action.235
Arguably, a writ of mandamus could afford relief against federal
officials to the same extent permitted in actions for injunctions, declaratory relief, and other equitable remedies. Since the issuance of mandatory injunctions and writs of mandamus are "governed by like con229. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944).
230. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
231. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
232. Walker v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d 66, 67 (1966); Carey v. Local Bd. No. 2, 297
F. Supp. 252, 255 n.3 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 412 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1969).
233. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 1, at 331-36; Jurisdictional Basis, supra note 1,

at 131-41.

234. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 1, at 331-36.
235. 3 DAvIS, supra note 55, § 23.12, at 361 (1958).
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siderations, ' ' 2 8 the following discussion of Cole v. Lynn, 2 7 a recent
mandatory injunction action, suggests a potential use for the writ of
mandamus in controlling the actions of federal officials. In the Cole
case, a preliminary injunction issued requiring affirmative action by
the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to restore eight apartment buildings which had been ordered
demolished, to aid those tenants desiring to return to the apartments,
and to provide security services to prevent further vandalism to the
buildings. While the Secretary of HUD was vested with the discretion
to determine whether to demolish such housing projects, plaintiffs
made a prima facie showing that the Secretary had acted arbitrarily
and irrationally in exercising this discretion. The case was characterized by Judge Gesell as "one of those distinctive cases ...in which
'the status quo is a condition not of rest, but of action.' ",238 Mandatory
rather than prohibitory relief was deemed necessary to prevent continuing irreparable injury to the former tenants.
The case law further demonstrates that the courts are evolving
the "rational law of mandamus" propounded by Professors Byse and
Fiocca. In Martin v. Schlesinger,239 the plaintiffs were a group of
Marine Corps reservists seeking, inter alia, to enjoin Marine Corps
authorities from harassing and giving unsatisfactory grades to reservists for wearing short hair wigs. Finding jurisdiction over the
action under section 1361, the court observed:
Traditionally, relief based upon federal mandamus procedure was
confined to ministerial duties. However this Court adopts the
recent expansion of the scope of relief available pursuant to
"Mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361
mandamus ....
in remedy," such that the injunctive and deflexibility
permits
claratory relief sought in40 the present case is not inconsistent with
this jurisdictional basis.*

236. Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442, 452 (1934). In Miguel, the Supreme Court
affirmed a directive from a lower court which ordered the Government to pay a pension to a member of the Philippines Scouts under several congressional enactments.
The suit was characterized as an action "to enjoin interference" with the payments
process, but it was in fact in the nature of mandamus. The Court noted that:
The mandatory injunction here prayed for is in effect equivalent to a writ of
mandamus, and governed by like considerations.
Id. at 452. See also Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28 (1897) ; Note,
Mandatory Injunctions as Substitutes for Writs of Mandamus in the Federal District
Courts, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1938).
237. 389 F. Supp. 99 (D.D.C. 1975).
238. Id. at 105, quoting Toledo R.R. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 730, 741 (N.D.
Ohio 1893).
239. 371 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
240. Id. at 639-40, quoting Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877, 883 n.10 (1973)
(footnotes omitted).
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A series of cases dealing with the impoundment of appropriated
funds by the executive branch of the government typifies a situation
in which mandamus relief was most appropriate but seldom utilized to
its full potential. This litigation was initiated as a result of the impoundment of federal funds appropriated to the states by the Secretary
of the Department of Transportation under the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1956,41 purportedly to assist in the control of inflation. In each
of the cases reaching the courts of appeals, the actions of the Secretary
of the Department of Transportation were deemed invalid, 242 granting
relief usually on the ground that the Secretary had exceeded the discretion granted to him under the Highway Act. Although the courts
conceded that the Secretary had discretion to withhold funds for
certain limited purposes, impoundment for general economic welfare
was not considered to be within the scope of that discretion.243 While
most courts dealing with this question have relied upon general federal
question jurisdiction, 4 4 the Eighth Circuit, in State Highway Commission v. Volpe, 45 commented on the propriety of using the federal
mandamus statute as a basis for jurisdiction. 24 6 The district court
in that case issued a writ of mandamus under section 1361 compelling
the release of funds for fiscal year 1973, but the Department of Transportation had actually released funds for that year prior to the date
judgment was entered. The action for mandamus was, therefore,
rendered moot. Nonetheless, the court observed:
[I]f the Secretary was not delegated any discretionary power to
withhold obligational authority for anti-inflationary purposes, the
Secretary would be acting outside the scope of his power and
it would appear
that mandamus was intended to provide a basis
247
for such relief.
241. 28 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1970).
242. E.g., Iowa ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Brinegar, 512 F.2d 722 (8th
Cir. 1975); State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973). See
also JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., COURT
CHALLENGES TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH IMPOUNDMENTS OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS (Comm.

Print 1974). See generally Hearings on Executive Impoundment of Appropriated
Funds Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Abascal & Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part I: Historical Genesis and Constitutional Framework, 62 GEO. L.J.
1549 (1974).
243. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1114 (8th Cir.

1975).
244. See, e.g., Iowa ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Brinegar, 512 F.2d 722
(8th Cir. 1975); State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973);
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Brinegar, 388 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1975). In Brinegar
the court also used the federal mandamus statute as a basis for jurisdiction.
245. 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).

246. Id. at 1104 n.6.
247. Id.
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CONCLUSIONS

This study has traced the development of common law mandamus
and its statutory successor in the federal courts from its creation in
the English courts until the present. The narrow use to which mandamus has been put in the modern era by American courts sharply varies
from its initial purpose and use in the English common law courts.
The American development of mandamus has largely been the product
of the courts of the District of Columbia, due to a unique twist of
history whereby the federal courts lacked statutory mandamus jurisdiction, while the District of Columbia courts retained such jurisdiction from its adoption of the Maryland common law.
Congressional action in 1962 authorizing a federal writ of mandamus has been thoroughly explored in many studies. The writ's development has been a modest one, based largely upon the District of
Columbia's case law and strict construction of ministerial and discretionary acts by federal courts.
The frontiers of judicial creativity under the federal mandamus
statute were first seen when the courts were called upon to police
flagrant abuses of due process procedures by military authorities in
the 1960's. First amendment free speech rights were early protected
by the federal courts through mandamus, despite a strong statutory
and case law tradition of noninvolvement in the daily affairs of the
armed services. Then the courts called upon the military to honor
their own regulations and to afford fair hearing and due process
rights under the fifth amendment. These fifth amendment rights developed in-to the mainstay of mandamus actions, when review of
administrative decisions was unobtainable under the Administrative
Procedure Act or insufficient dollar claims precluded jurisdiction under
other statutes.
Actions involving procedural irregularities in federal housing
programs have been corrected by writs of mandamus. In several cases
involving the housing and Model Cities acts, the courts have granted
requested relief upon a broad reading of the basic enabling statute
authorizing the programs. This approach is quite similar to that of
early mandamus in England and is one way in which "reasonable"
discretion can be reviewed, such review being statutorily precluded by
the APA review provisions.
While mandamus has not yet developed a heritage of its own
and cannot be identified as "the" appropriate jurisdictional basis for
action, it is viewed as a catch-all basis for federal court jurisdiction.
Mandamus should not be tied to the narrow review provisions of the
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APA and the rigid ministerial-discretionary dichotomy as articulated
by the Supreme Court. It should be available as a vehicle to challenge
an administrator's decisions and to force them to be reviewed under
the light of public scrutiny.
The broadening of the availability of the mandamus action, as
contemplated by the courts of the District of Columbia, might return
mandamus to its earliest history. Coupled with the expansion to allow
access to more plaintiffs should be the availability of a writ of mandamus to compel the exercise of administrative discretion, in much the
same manner that a federal appellate court can so direct a federal trial
judge. These twin thrusts of mandamus development, combined with
the ability and willingness of the federal court to review federal administrative actions in light of the basic purpose of the enabling statutes,
will afford a salutory development in the law of mandamus, and
return this ancient and arcane writ to its proper and historic function.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976

37

